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Abstract 
System engineering techniques have been employed to: (1) identify possible 
sources of contamination; (2) develop required mathematical modeling; and 
(3) specify tests required to furnish experimental data for system trade-off studies. 
The mathematical models developed in the study have made possible several 
sensitivity simulations. These have indicated the importance of the contamination 
problem and have also pointed out areas where further experimental data or 
analytical work will be useful. 
From this study, it will be possible to identify the most likely sources of con- 
tamination and to indicate corrective action. Knowledge from these studies can 
be applied to such questions as: (1) aim-point philosophy to be followed in the 
launch trajectory; (2) the need for decontamination or sterilization of the attitude 
control gas systems; (3) the recommendation of cleanliness levels during the 
manufacturing cycle; and (4) whether decontamination or sterilization will be 
necessary to achieve the required planetary quarantine goal. 
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Planetary Quarant ine  
Techniques for the Prevention of Contamination of the Planets by 
Unsterile Spaceflight Hardware 
1. Introduction 
A policy of planetary quarantine has been established 
to insure that no act will be performed during the period 
of planetary exploration that might spoil the scientific 
investigations of the planets, It is expected that these 
investigations will include the search for extraterrestrial 
life, and the collection of information leading to a better 
understanding of the origin of life. Provisions for the 
sterilization of all planetary probes or landers are in- 
cluded in the quarantine to prevent possible contamina- 
tion that might interfere with attempts to determine the 
nature and existence of extraterrestrial life. Microorga- 
nisms could be deposited by an unsterilized lander, de- 
stroying future chances of determining if life forms have 
originated on the planet. In addition, the quarantine 
must be maintained for several years to allow for experi- 
ments sufficient to adequately define the planet’s bio- 
sphere (Refs. 1-6). 
The Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) of the 
International Council of Scientific Unions has formu- 
lated general recommendations for planetary quarantine 
(Refs. 7 and 8). In May 1966, the COSPAR Subcommittee 
for Planetary Quarantine recommended that the basic 
probability of that a planet of biological interest will 
be contaminated during the period of biological explora- 
tion be adopted as a guiding criterion by all nations en- 
gaged in space exploration. 
To meet this criterion, careful consideration must 
be given to the many possible sources of contamination 
that can be identified in the planning of a particular 
flight program, especially a program utilizing an un- 
sterilized spacecraft for long-term orbit about a planet. 
A typical flight program for the investigation of Mars 
during the 1970s has been recently defined (Ref. 9). The 
plan calls for two planetary vehicles to be launched 
from a single Saturn V. Each of the vehicles will be 
placed in orbit around Mars. After selection of a suit- 
able landing site, each will eject a capsule for deorbit 
and landing. The spacecrafts will remain in orbit to per- 
form various scientific experiments, and to serve as relay 
points for information from the separated lander cap- 
sules. Each capsule will incorporate entry and landing 
equipment, and a surface laboratory system for surface 
observations including biological experiments. 
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Noncontamination of Mars during the flights is a lead- 
ing mission constraint. To make certain this constraint is 
fully considered during early engineering studies, system 
analysis techniques have been employed to identify all 
possible sources of contamination, and to evaluate these 
sources with respect to each other to insure that the 
mission can be accomplished without unduly penalizing 
any one portion of the mission. The purpose of this 
study is to describe the analysis techniques and experi- 
ments used, and to point out those sources that may be 
significant and worthy of detailed evaluation. 
A. inadequately Sterilized lander 
II. Sources of Contamination 
To identify sources of contamination, it was first nec- 
essary to develop general constraint guidelines as a base 
of reference. The following guidelines were used for this 
study (Ref. 10): 
(1) All aspects of the flight program, including the 
complex interactions of the spacecraft with the in- 
terplanetary environment, shall be examined to 
isolate every conceivable source of planetary con- 
tamination. 
(2) Each separate source of contamination shall be 
investigated to yield an adequate understanding 
of the process through which it occurs. Whenever 
possible, mathematical models shall be formulated 
that adequately characterize the probability of 
contamination. These mathematical models shall 
be based upon standard probabilistic techniques, 
and the limitations and assumptions inherent in 
their formulation shall be explicitly described in 
the explanation of their validity. 
(3) For those sources of contamination that can be 
adequately described by a mathematical model, 
formulae shall be propounded to calculate the 
probability of planetary contamination. Conserva- 
tive assumptions shall be employed whenever un- 
certainties are present in the derivation of these 
formulae. 
(4) Whenever an adequate mathematical model is im- 
possible (for example, when the necessary assump- 
tions are not meaningful), every effort shall be 
exerted to describe suitable ranges or bounds for 
the chances of planetary contamination. 
Using these general constraint guidelines as a refer- 
ence base, the following sources of contamination were 
identified for investigation. 
(1) One or more viable organisms (VOs) remain on the 
outer surface of the lander capsule. 
(2) One or more viable organisms within-the capsule 
are released and diffused upon the planetary sur- 
face by 
(a) Disintegration of the capsule upon impact. 
(b) Erosion of the encapsulated areas. 
B. Recontamination of the Sterile lander 
(1) Prior to launch by handling. 
(2) During launch (for example, by breach of micro- 
(3) During interplanetary transfer by penetration of 
(4) During barrier release. 
(5)  After barrier release by unsterile debris. 
(6) During capsule release (for example, by electro- 
biological barrier). 
the microbiological barrier. 
static attractions). 
C. Accidental Impact of the launch Vehicle or Parts 
of the launch Vehicle 
(1) Failure of the launch vehicle retromaneuver, or 
retromaneuver is of insufficient magnitude. 
(2) Launch vehicle debris (for example, clamps, rings, 
and bolts) are placed on an impact trajectory. 
(3) Launch vehicle detonates, scattering debris on an 
impact trajectory. 
D. Accidental Impact of the Unsterile Spacecraft and/or 
Decay of the Unsterile-Spacecraft Orbit 
(1) The spacecraft fails after injection into an impact 
trajectory. 
(2) The spacecraft fails after being placed on an im- 
pact trajectory by the first or subsequent mid- 
course maneuvers. 
(3) Large orbit determination errors (including errors 
in the astronomical unit and the Mars ephemeris) 
near the planet cause impact. 
(4) Orbit insertion errors result in impact or rapidly 
decaying orbit. 
(5) The nominal spacecraft orbit decays prematurely 
due to miscalculation of the Martian atmosphere. 
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E. Accidental Impacts of Various Standard and 
Nonstandard Spacecraft Ejecta 
(1) Ejecta released during heliocentric cruise are 
placed on an impact trajectory. 
(a) Attitude control gas. 
(b) Spalling. 
(c) Outgassing. 
(d) Particles ejected by micrometeoroid impacts. 
(e) Propulsion system exhaust gases. 
impact trajectory. 
placed on an impact trajectory. 
placed on an impact trajectory. 
impact trajectory. 
(2) Ejected microbiological barrier is placed on an 
(3) Debris released at time of barrier separation are 
(4) Debris released at time of capsule separation are 
(5) Debris caused by detonation are scattered on an 
Midcourse maneuvers. 
Orbit insertion maneuver. 
Capsule deflection maneuver. 
Abort rocket (if present). 
Pyrotechnics. 
Orbit trim maneuvers. 
(6) Ejecta released during orbiting phase decay into 
the Martian atmosphere. 
(a) Attitude control gas. 
(b) Spalling. 
(c) Outgassing. 
(d) Particles ejected by micrometeoroid impacts. 
(e) Propulsion system exhaust gases. 
(7) Solar pressure eventually causes spinning that 
ejects debris, which decay into the Martian 
atmosphere. 
CAPSULE 
STERILE 
STER I L E  
CAPSULE 
RECONTAMINATED 
LAUNCH 
CONTAMINATION VEHICLE 
IMPACT 
FLIGHT 
SPACECRAFT 
EJECTA/EFFLUX € tMPACT 
RES I STANT ORGANISMS 
PROCEDURE FAILS 
BARRIER LEAKS 
DURING SEPARATION 
AFTER BARRIER IS OPENED 
RETRO FAILURE 
MANEUVER INSUFFICENT 
BOOSTER DEBRIS 
BOOSTER DETONATES 
Fig. 1. Possible sources of contamination 
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INJECTION FAILURE 
MIDCOURSE MANEUVER FAILURE 
ORBIT DETERMINATION ERROR 
ORBIT INSERTION FAILURE 
EARLY ORBIT DECAY 
MIDCOURSE PROPULSION EXHAUST 
EJECTED COLD GAS 
SPALLING FROM METEROID IMPACT 
OUTGASSING 
DETONATION 
3 
6. MARS ORBIT INSERTION- 
PLANETARY VEHICLE INSERTED 
INTO ORBIT ABOUT MARS AND 
BEGINS ORBITAL OPERATIONS 
7. PLANETARY VEHICLE ORBITAL 
REFERENCES REACQUIRED 
OPERATIONS -EXTERNAL 
8. MARS ORBIT CORRECTION- 
CORRECTION OF THE ORBITAL 
PARAMETERS FOR THE 
PLANETARY VEHICLE 
9. SPACECRAFT/CAPSULE 
SEPARATION - STERILIZATION 
CANNISTER OPENED FLIGHT 
CAPSULE SEPARATED AND 
FLIGHT SPACECRAFT RETURNED 
TO ORBITAL OPERATIONS 
IO. FLIGHT CAPSULE DEORBIT 
MANEUVER - FLIGHT CAPSULE 
PLACED ON IMPACT TRAJECTORY 
1 1 .  FLIGHT CAPSULE ORBITAL 
DESCENT - DEORBIT 
MANEUVER AND DESCENT 
12. FLIGHT CAPSULE ENTRY - 
ENTRY, TERMINAL DECELERATION 
AND OPERATIONS IN ATMOSPHERE 
13. FLIGHT CAPSULE DESCENT- 
CAPSULE IMPACTS SURFACE 
OF MARS, AND SURFACE OPERATIONS 
INITIATED FOR SURVIVING CAPSULES 
14 FLIGHT SPACECRAFT ORBITAL 
OPERATIONS - ORBITER MISSION 
TRANSMISSION 
I .  PRELAUNCH - FINAL ASSEMBLY, 
STERILIZATION AND 
CERTIFICATION 
4. INTERPLANETARY CRUISE - 
EVENTS AND SEQUENCES 
DURING FLIGHT TO MARS 
WHEN PLANETARY VEHICLE 
IS ON EXTERNAL REFERENCES 
2 .  LAUNCH AND INJECTION - 
COUNTDOWN, LAUNCH, PARKING 
ORBIT, INSERTION, INTERPLANETARY 
TRANSIT TRAJECTORY INJECTION 
3. CELESTIAL REFERENCE 
ACQUISITION - ACQUISITION OF 5. INTERPLANETARY TRAJECTORY 
CELESTIAL ATTITUDE REFERENCES CORRECTIONS - CORRECTION OF 
AND EXECUTION OF SEQUENCES 
LEADING TO CRUISE STATUS RETURN TO CRUISE STATUS 
TRANSIT TRAJECTORY AND 
Fig. 2. Mission events in flight profile 
The sources of contamination are summarized in 
Fig. 1; key mission events in the flight profile are 
shown in Fig. 2. 
111. Mathematical Model 
The mathematical model necessary to calculate the 
probability of contaminating Mars must, in effect, be a 
representation of the physical phenomena associated 
with the various contamination sources (Ref. 11). These 
physical phenomena can be grouped into three major 
elements. 
The first element involves the number of viable 
microorganisms initially present in each source. The 
second element concerns the transport phenomena: 
the means by which these initially present microorga- 
nisms travel from the spacecraft to the Martian surface. 
The third element concerns the effect of various lethal 
environmental factors, or kill mechanisms, that tend to 
reduce the number of viable organisms. 
Figure 3 is a matrix of the various specific elements in 
the mathematical model of this problem. For the pur- 
poses of this illustration, only four possible sources of 
contamination are listed. The numbered columns of the 
matrix (the specific elements) describe how particles 
might find their way to the surface of Mars and the 
effects of various lethal environments on these sources. 
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ROUTE TO MARS - 
Fig. 3. Mathematical model format 
The first column lists the number of viable organisms 
initially present in the contamination source. Column 
No. 2 lists the number surviving the approximate six- 
month transit to Mars. Column No. 3 represents the 
effect of the ejection process on the contamination 
source, and contains information of two types: (1) the 
rate at which microorganisms are ejected from the sys- 
tem, and (2) whether the microorganisms are killed in 
the process. For example, the second contamination 
source, the “Orbit Insertion Engine,” involves ejecta that 
are subjected to temperatures of approximately 6000” F 
for several milliseconds. The entry under “Ejection 
Process,” then, is simply the probability of microorga- 
nisms surviving these temperatures and time durations. 
Column No. 4, concerns the probability of survival 
during the transport process. This entry involves the 
orbit mechanics related to the gas molecules and micro- 
organisms that leave the system at various velocities and 
in various directions in space. The fraction of these or- 
ganisms and the gas molecules actually placed on a 
Mars impact trajectory is indicated. 
Columns 5, 6, 7, and 8 list several possible kill mecha- 
nisms. Column 9 contains the calculations concerning 
the effect of atmospheric heating on viable organisms as 
particulate material enters the Martian atmosphere at 
high velocity. Column 10 provides for a “growth and 
JPL TECHNICAL REPORT 32-1216 
contamination” factor as determined at the May 1966 
COSPAR meetings, and discussed on page 1 of this re- 
port, Finally, Column 11 contains the total probability 
of contamination from a particular source; the sum of 
Column 11 is the total probability of contaminating 
Mars from all sources for the given mission under study. 
A series of computer programs were developed that 
essentially perform the mathematical analysis repre- 
sented by the matrix shown in Fig. 3. Initially, the ques- 
tion arose as to whether the analysis should be based on 
average values, that is, the average number of microor- 
ganisms that might be expected in a given contamination 
source. Such an approach was discarded because average 
values would be used for input information, resulting in 
an answer in terms of the average. A second method 
considered was to work with maximum, or worst case 
data (that is, the maximum possible number of organisms 
in the contamination source). This approach was also dis- 
carded because the final result would be a worst case 
number, hence, an unrealistic one. 
The approach chosen as most realistic was to formu- 
late the input information into probability distributions. 
Figure 4 illustrates an initial microbial loading distribu- 
tion presented in terms of probability. Probability PI 
represents a certain chance that between 0 and 10 viable 
organisms are associated with the particular source. P, 
5 
VIABLE ORGANISM INITIAL LOADING 
Fig. 4. Input data format 
through P, represent different probabilities carried out 
to the last significant interval. Similarly, various input 
information necessary throughout the analysis was in 
most cases represented as distributions. For instance, to 
perform the orbit mechanics analysis on ejected parti- 
cles, it is necessary to have input information on the 
source of the particles, their size, velocity and trajectory. 
An example of the resulting distributive-type output is 
shown in Fig. 5. 
An example of the detail contained in the analysis and 
the nature of the input and output information obtained 
from one column can be seen in Fig. 6. The heliocentric 
portion of the orbit mechanics is indicated on this chart. 
The spacecraft is located at any point in the transfer 
trajectory from earth to Mars. An impact plane is shown 
with Mars located relative to the coordinate axis, which 
represents the aim point of the spacecraft trajectory. The 
input information used in this program is shown at 
/--0.0006 i / 7 0.0002 TOTAL PROBABILITY= 0.0000095 (5-100) /- 
TOTAL PROBABILITY= 
0.0000005 (I 00- I@OO,OOO) 
0 1  2 3  4 5 100 1,000,000 
No. OF VOs REACHING MAR'S SURFACE AND CONTINUING TO SURVIVE PRIOR TO TIME T- 
Fig. 5. Typical distributive output format 
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PART I C  L E 
IMPACT POINT 
TRANSFER ORB 
TO AIM POINT 
SPACECRAFT 
INPUTS OUTPUTS 
MISS DISTANCE 
EN T RY CO NDl TlONS 
ORBIT TYPE 
FIXED [AIM SEPARATION POINT ~~ TIME HELIOCENTRIC 
COMPUTER PROGRAM 
LINEAR PROPAGATION 
OF PERTURBATIONS 3 A Y  COMPONENTS 
vARIABLE BALLISTIC COEFFICENT 
Fig. 6. Orbit mechanics for heliocentric trajectory 
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0 
0' 7 5 O  105O 180' 
> 
OUTPUT 
HELIOCENTRIC 
T R A N S F O R M A T I O N  
I DAYS TO 
ENCOUNTER, r f  !$ ,-0.22 
I -  
0 
I O  
20 
40 
0.5 
0.3 
0.2 
I 
Fig. 7. Typical heliocentric orbit mechanics data 
the bottom of the figure; it consists of the type of trans- 
fer trajectory, the coordinates of the aim point, the num- 
ber of days prior to Mars encounter, the speed of the 
particles, direction of the particles, and finally informa- 
tion on the ballistic coefficient which, in effect, is size 
information. Figure 7 illustrates how the parameters of 
speed, direction, and size are used as input distributions. 
Similarly, the output for miss distance is shown in dis- 
tribution format. 
Another example of a major analytical effort contained 
in the computer analytical model is seen in Fig. 8, which 
shows a time vs temperature profile of a specific small 
particle calculated for three entry angles. The many 
variables required to calculate just one time vs tempera- 
ture profile for a single particle as it enters the Martian 
atmosphere are also listed. The program used two dif- 
ferent atmospheres to study the effect of the atmosphere 
definition, and was able to accept distributive-type input 
information on velocities, direction in space, ballistic 
parameters, and emissivity. 
0.03 
0 
I 
>- 
2 
k 
m a 
m 
0 0  
[L a 
- 
I 
0 
0 20 40 60 80 100 IO3, 
MISS DISTANCE , 
IO3 km 
IV. Tests and Experiments 
In addition to the major parametric analyses and the 
various computer programs made available by the math- 
ematical model, input information on the many con- 
tamination sources to be studied was necessary. Many 
of the problems concerning these sources have not been 
previously investigated, and a great deal of the input 
information did not exist at the initiation of this study. 
Consequently, a series of experimental programs were 
conducted, aimed at yielding insight into these problems, 
and particularly at obtaining experimental data to be 
used as input information in the contamination analysis. 
A. The Orbit Insertion Engine 
The largest of these experimental efforts concerns the 
orbit insertion engine used during the Mars mission. 
Because the engine is extremely large (on the order of 
10,000 lb) and might be fired close to Mars, it is very 
important to determine whether the engine poses a con- 
tamination threat. Solving the problems associated with 
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PARAMETERS: 
ATMOSPHERE MODEL 
INITIAL ALTITUDE 
lNlT I AL TEMPERATURE 
ABSORBED SOLAR POWER 
DRAG COEFFICIENT 
PARTICLE DENSITY 
PARTICLE RADIUS (SPHERE) 
TE = 90" 
PARTICLE SPECIFIC HEAT 
BALLISTIC COEFFICIENT 
INITIAL VELOCITY 
ENTRY ANGLE,TE 
PARTICLE EMISSIVITY 
CAPACITY 
~ 1 1 1 1 l 1 1 1  
0 60 IO0 160 zoo 250 
TIME, s 
Fig. 8. Particle temperature histories 
sterilization of the engine, if sterilization is proven nec- 
essary, requires a significant engineering undertaking. 
The experimental effort consisted of a thorough prelim- 
inary feasibility study, followed by the design and 
initiation of a test program using three types of small 
engines: solid, monopropellant liquid, and bipropellant 
liquid (Ref. 12). A known number of microorganisms 
were inoculated into an engine, which was then fired 
into a test chamber. After the firing, the chamber was 
bioassayed to determine the number of viable organisms 
present. The equipment used for these tests is illustrated 
in Fig. 9. For the test to be meaningful, many factors had 
to be carefully analyzed before the actual combustion 
firings . 
Figure 10 indicates dwell time vs temperature, an im- 
portant relationship subject to control. Both the calcu- 
lated time-temperature of the real solid motor, and the 
calculated time-temperature to be simulated with the test 
engine and the heat chamber are shown. Twenty-two 
test firings of development engines were undertaken to 
verify and control the time-temperature simulation for 
all the engines. 
8. Bioassay Procedures 
Another major factor affecting the validity of the test 
results concerned the bioassay procedures. A series of 
tests were undertaken to develop and calibrate reliable 
bioassay recovery procedures before the actual test fir- 
ings were undertaken. 
C. Ejecta Size 
A second major experimental program was undertaken 
to determine the size of the ejecta leaving the spacecraft 
when impacted by a micrometeoroid. Information was 
also desired on how many ejected viable organisms 
might be killed by the micrometeorite impact process 
and how many would remain alive and on a path toward 
Mars. 
A micrometeoroid simulator facility capable of firing 
5-pm particles at an average velocity of 30,000 ft/s was 
used for this program (Ref. 13). A schematic diagram of 
this facility is shown in Fig. 11. An explosive charge 
shown at the top of the figure was detonated to send 
small micron-size iron particles through the vacuum re- 
gion in the middle into the target area or trap located 
at the bottom of the apparatus. Targets were inoculated 
on the top and bottom with a known number of micro- 
organisms and placed in the center of this trap. A gela- 
tin catcher medium was located above and below the 
target. After the firing, the entire micrometeorite trap 
was removed to a biological laboratory, disassembled, 
and bioassayed. Figure 12 indicates the type of informa- 
tion obtained for the size distribution of the ejecta. 
Table 1 lists typical materials used on a spacecraft, in- 
cluding the four that were selected for testing. The 
initial phase of the program consisted of more than 40 
test firings as the apparatus and the bioassay procedures 
were developed. The final test program involved a ma- 
trix of tests for the four major materials tested. The tests 
Table 1. Spacecraft materials 
Material 
Aluminuma 
Aluminum 
Aluminum 
Aluminum' 
Magnesium 
Magnesium 
Stainless steel 
Honeycomb 
Honeycomb 
Fiberglass-epoxy 
sheetg 
Solar cell 
coverglass" 
Electric cabling 
Silica phenolic tapc 
with graphite 
Alloy 
2024-T4 
Mesh 
7075-T6 
6061 
HM2 1 A-1 8 
ZK60A-TS 
(Haynes alloy) 
(Phenolic) 
(Aluminum) 
(Textolite) 
(Fused silica) 
Thickness, mils 
3-65 
10 
10, 60 
40 
60 
65 
45 
0.25 in. 
0.64 in. 
17 
10 
10 
> 100 
>Zoo 
iurface area, f+ 
1651.3 
6.7 
22.3 
713.0 
17.3 
50.0 
4.3 
56.3 
24.0 
226.0 
226.0 
3.0 
36.7 
5.3 
IlSelected for testing. 
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MONOPROPELLANT 
ENGINE 
I 
SOLID PROPELLANT 
MOTOR 
a 
BIPROPELLANT 
ENGINE 
7 ALUM SPACER 
ALUM PLUGJ 
SECTION AA HEAT 
EXCHANGER PLUGS 
10 
Fig. 9. Combustion lethality equipment 
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consisted of three levels of inoculation, and four repli- 
cate tests at each point for the four materials. 
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D. Manufacturing Debris 
Another area where very little data were available 
concerned the mechanism of various loose particles de- 
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posited on the spacecraft during the manufacturing cycle 
that would be free to leave the spacecraft during the 
mission and carry viable organisms, as passengers, to 
Mars. Analysis of this problem required information on 
the number of particles that might accumulate on the 
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Fig. 12. Micrometeoroid ejecta size distribution 
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spacecraft and their size distributions. A program was 
undertaken that included data from existing spacecraft 
programs (Nimbus). The available data on certain par- 
ticle size ranges and on spacecraft cleaning methods 
were reviewed and summarized. In addition, new infor- 
mation was obtained on the smaller size ranges. Fig- 
ure 13 shows the particle size vs distribution for several 
of the programs surveyed. 
E. Attitude Control Gas System 
An experimental program was also conducted on the 
attitude control gas system as a contamination source 
(Ref. 14). A scaled-down model of a spacecraft attitude 
control system was fabricated. Special filters were de- 
veloped to cover the nozzle, and a series of typical Mars- 
mission firing sequences were carried out. The output 
from the filtered nozzle was collected and bioassayed. 
After a full test sequence, the entire system’was installed 
on a vibration fixture and vibrated at a rate equivalent 
to the launch vibration level. The full test sequence was 
then repeated to determine whether vibration released 
viable organisms within the system to be expelled with 
the gas. In addition to the work on this engine, some 
tests were performed on an existing Nimbus spacecraft 
attitude control system. 
% 
I W 
600 - - 
k a a 
500  
40 0 
300 
2 0 0  
I O 0  
0 
AVERAGE 
MAXIMUM 
1-1 CLEANED - 
--- 
v r A  UNCLEANED -.a AVERAGE 
-X-X MAXIMUM ( Nf MBUS 1 
: 
25 50 75 100 125 150 175 2 0 0  225 250 500 I O 0  
SIZE, prn 
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F. Unprotected Microorganisms in Space to Mars (Ref. 15). The space simulator used was a 
spherical high-vacuum chamber capable of pumping to 
torr. A molecular trap within the chamber provided 
up to 99.97% capture of condensable molecules escaping 
from the test specimen. The various tests included expo- 
sure at temperatures ranging from 22 to 60°C. 
It is likely that the space environment could affect the 
rate of die-off of unprotected microorganisms. To evalu- 
ate this rate of die-off, a series of tests have recently 
been undertaken in a space simulator. These tests were 
designed to delineate the individual and combined ef- - 
fects of ultra-high vacuum and temperature on the Results indicate a significant die-off of unprotected 
viability of B.  subtilis variety niger spores, using thermal- microorganisms during exposure to the simulated space 
vacuum relationships previously observed with the environment. Further tests and statistical analysis of the 
Mariner IV solar panels during the interplanetary cruise data are required to validate and quantitate the results. 
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